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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past decade, the proliferation of hostile takeover activity has spawned
many innovative defensive strategies by target companies.' However, corporate
directors do not have unlimited discretion to fend off hostile tender offers. They are
limited by their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders. 2 The
business judgment rule is the generally accepted standard of judicial review regarding
the adoption of defensive measures by directors in a hostile takeover situation. 3
Courts differ on the allocation 4 and degree5 of the burden of proof in applying the
business judgment rule to a situation involving corporate control. Judicial interpre-
tation of the rules governing fiduciary conduct must adequately scrutinize a target
company's defensive tactics to ensure that the directors have fulfilled their fiduciary
duties and have remained responsive to the corporation and the shareholders. Two
recent Supreme Court of Delaware decisions, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.6
and Moran v. Household International, Inc. ,7 considered the allocation of the burden
of proof in a hostile takeover situation under the business judgment rule. In both
cases, the court held that the burden of proof was appropriately shifted to the directors
to show that reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed and that the defensive mechanism adopted was reasonable in
relation to the threat posed. 8
This Note considers the judicial perspective of the duty of loyalty on corporate
management in a hostile takeover situation. Part I will examine both the business
judgment rule and the duty of loyalty and the relationship of each to a target
company's defensive maneuvers. Part II will detail the variations in judicial
allocation of the burden of proof under business judgment rule analyses of defensive
tactics. Part III will scrutinize the different standards that courts have imposed on
directors to justify their defensive tactics. Part IV will examine the decisions in
Unocal and Moran. Part V will analyze the implications of these cases for the
1. Specific takeover defensive strategies are discussed in E. ARAsow, H. ENHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEvELoP.%IENTS
N TENR OrEs FOR COPORAm COTROL 193-202 (1977); M. LIPToN & E. STlEINBRER, 1 TAKEOvERS AND FREsE oins § 6.05
(1986).
2. Fiduciaries must act in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In addition, fiduciaries' actions
may not exceed their authority or the powers of the corporation. For example, if a target company's defensive tactics were
designed to bankrupt the company, the fiduciaries' actions arguably breached their obligations to the company. For a
general discussion of corporate directors' fiduciary duties, see H. HEN- & J. ALV',.MoR, LAWS OF CoRoRAIoNs §§ 231-42
(3d ed. 1983).
3. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 28-99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
6. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
7. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 134-45 (regarding the Unocal decision) and 172-79 (regarding the Moran
decision).
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application of the business judgment rule in future actions challenging a target
company's defensive tactics.
II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
The business judgment rule is a principle of judicial review for corporate
conduct. 9 Generally stated:
[A] court will not interfere with the judgment of the board of directors unless there is a
showing of gross and palpable overreaching. A board of directors enjoys a presumption of
sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to
any rational business purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment. '0
Many compelling reasons underlie the rule. Primarily, courts and commentators
firmly believe that directors are more competent to make business decisions than are
the courts. I I Furthermore, such business decisions mandate that directors be afforded
substantial discretion to establish effective corporate policies. ' 2 Moreover, given the
nature of the business world, many decisions are made on information markedly less
substantial than the rigid evidentiary standards demanded in a court of law. Corporate
directors should not be held responsible for higher standards in a court than are
demanded by the open market. In addition, market forces effectively monitor
corporate policy, weeding out inefficient management. 13 The business judgment rule
relieves the courts from reviewing the merits of business decisions that the courts
often feel inadequate to second-guess. 14 The rule's immunity-the privilege of
human error-"encourages competent people to become directors without fear of
personal liability for honest errors in judgment."' 5
The business judgment rule is a presumption embracing two tenets of fiduciary
responsibility: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires the
fiduciary to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar position
would use under similar circumstances.t6 Such care must be exercised before a
9. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), in
which the court explained:
The business judgment rule has evolved as a corollary to the principle that a board of directors stands in a
fiduciary relationship to the shareholders it represents. Because the role of a fiduciary ordinarily does not admit
of any conflicting interests or conduct the business judgment rule seeks to accommodate that status to the
realities of the business world.
490 A.2d 1059, 1074.
10. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (citation omitted).
11. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1195-96 (1981).
12. See Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 621, 650-51
(1983).
13. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1196.
14. See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Tvo-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred,
97 HAnv. L. REv. 1964, 1969 (1984); Note, supra note 12, at 651.
15. Note, supra note 12, at 651. See also Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests
for Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 980, 983-84 (1982) ("Without such protection, few qualified people would be
willing to serve as directors, and those that could be coerced to serve would be reluctant to undertake business risks.").
16. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates,
600 F. Supp. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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fiduciary renders a business decision; "a judgment reached without... [due care] is
not entitled to the presumptive protection which otherwise would be provided by the
business judgment rule." 17
The duty of loyalty, or good faith, is derived from the prohibition against
self-dealing inherent in the fiduciary relationship. ' 8 The presumptions of the business
judgment rule are inapplicable to a situation in which a fiduciary faces a conflict of
interest. 19 Once a fiduciary is proven to have engaged in "self-dealing" or to have
a "material personal interest" in a corporate transaction, the decision is tainted and
the business judgment rule will not apply. 20 The burden then "shifts to the officer or
director, who must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaction was 'intrinsically fair' to the corporation and its stockholders.''21
This theoretical distinction between a director's duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion and the proscription against self-dealing is less rigid in actual practice. A director
often cannot avoid some taint of self-interest in order to act effectively as a director:
It is frequently said that directors are fiduciaries. Although this statement is true in some
senses, it is also obvious that if directors were held to the same standard as ordinary
fiduciaries the corporation could not conduct business. For example, an ordinary fiduciary
may not have the slightest conflict of interest in any transaction he undertakes on behalf of
the trust. Yet by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain amount of
self-interest in everything he does. The very fact that the director wants to enhance corporate
profits is in part attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that they will not
oust him. 22
The self-interest of corporate directors is especially apparent in the takeover
context. Some commentators view the directors' actions regarding a takeover attempt
as no different from other business decisions: their duty is to act in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders and, as such, their decisions should be
accorded the same presumptions as any other business decision. 23 Others question the
application of the business judgment rule to a takeover situation:
Given the serious and unavoidable conflict of interest that inheres in any decision on one's
own ouster, courts ought not to make available to a manager resisting a tender offer-and,
in effect, fighting against his own replacement-the same deference accorded to the
decisions of a manager in good standing.24
17. Comment, supra note 15, at 985. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-74 (Del. 1985) (there
is no protection under the business judgment rule for directors who have made unintelligent or unadvised decisions).
18. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264
(2d Cir. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
19. See Note, supra note 14, at 1969.
20. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L.
Rv. 647, 714 (1984).
21. Id. at 714-15. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1969 ("[Tlhe burden of showing the 'intrinsic fairness' of their
actions . . . entails a demonstration of the substantive fairness of the challenged transaction."). See generally Arsht, The
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSmA L. REv. 93, 115-16 (1979) (describing the intrinsic fairness rule).
22. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
23. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
24. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1198. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that directors of
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Assuming that it is proper for a board of directors to be actively involved in a
takeover situation 2 5-and there has been no indication that the courts feel other-
wise 26 -the doubt raised regarding their presumption of loyalty to the corporation
should preclude the application of the business judgment rule and shift the burden to
the directors to prove the intrinsic fairness of their actions. However, the courts have
declined to place such a burden on the directors and have applied a business judgment
rule analysis to takeover situations.2 7
III. THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD REGARDING
CHALLENGED DEFENSIVE TACTICS
In an action by a target company's shareholders challenging the defensive tactics
of that company's board of directors, the threshold issue for the court is whether the
challengers should bear the burden of attacking the disputed action or whether the
defendant directors must bear the burden of justification. Under the business
judgment rule, the presumptions of due care and good faith underlying the directors'
business decisions place the initial burden of proof on the challengers.2 8 In evaluating
a target company's defensive tactics, the uncertainties inherent in the application of
the good faith presumption have caused courts and commentators to differ regarding
the allocation of the initial burden and, if the burden is placed on the challenging
party, the standard required to shift the burden to the defendant directors.
A. Automatic Shift of Burden to the Directors
Several decisions, most notably in the Delaware state courts, have shifted the
burden of proof automatically to the directors when retention of control was
implicated. In Bennett v. Propp,2 9 one of the first cases to address this topic, Noma
target companies should be proscribed completely from efforts to resist a takeover because the decision whether or not
to accept the takeover bid is properly and competently within the province of the shareholders. Id. But see Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981) and Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979), which support the participation of target management in a
hostile takeover situation.
25. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("Iln the broad context of
corporate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board of directors is not a passive
instrumentality."); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
("duty of directors to evaluate proposed business combinations on their merits and oppose those detrimental to the
well-being of the corporation even if that is at the expense of the short term interests of individual shareholders").
26. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 1194-1204; and Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations; The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STaN. L. REv. 819, 831-48 (1981), in which
commentators argue that directors of target companies should be passive in a takeover attempt.
27. See Greene, Recent Tender Offer Developments: On the Edge or Deep In?, 45 OnIo ST. L.J. 721 (1984):
mhe first courts to review a board's decision to fight a tender offer were being asked to decide, as a threshold
matter, whether or not they should even attempt to second-guess the board's decision. At that time the legal
arena had reached no consensus as to what should be the proper response of directors in a takeover situation.
Without a consensus as to what was right, it was hard to judge whether the directors had acted improperly. The
courts also realized that if they chose the path of second-guessing, it could lead to their having to impose
tremendous damages on individual directors. Because the majority of directors often were not full-time
employees and thus appeared to be disinterested, and because of the intense judicial reluctance to get involved,
the courts uniformly chose an easier solution-the business judgment rule.
Id. at 729.
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29. 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
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Lites was faced with a potential takeover offer by Textron. In response, Noma's
chairman of the board purchased on the open market more than twenty-five percent
of his company's outstanding shares on behalf of the corporation. 30 This action was
not authorized by the board of directors; in fact, the board of directors did not know
of the chairman's purchases until two days before payment was due. 31 At that time,
the chairman presented the situation to the directors and asked that his actions be
ratified.3 2 The directors approved his actions and effected a loan of nearly three
million dollars to pay for the stock. 33 In a shareholders' suit for account against the
directors for ratifying the purchase, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated:
We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate
funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The
directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is
difficult.... Hence, in our opinion, the burden should be on the directors to justify such
a purchase as one primarily in the corporate interest.- 4
The control ramifications of the directors' actions caused the court to shift the
initial burden of proof to the directors as a matter of law. Thus, the plaintiffs were not
required to make an initial showing regarding the directors' motivations.
Similarly, in Cheff v. Mathes,35 shareholders of the Holland Furnace Company
brought a derivative suit to hold certain corporate directors liable for the loss caused
by the allegedly improper use of corporate funds to buy out a dissident stockholder.3 6
The defendant directors claimed that their actions were necessary to maintain the
company's sales program policies and to quell employee unrest caused by the
prospect of the dissident stockholder's potential control of the company. 37 The
plaintiffs maintained that the defendants' actual purpose was to insure the perpetu-
ation of control through the purchase of the dissident shareholder's stock.38 The
Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned:
[I]f the actions of the board were motivated by a sincere belief that the buying out of the
dissident stockholder was necessary to maintain what the board believed to be proper
business practices, the board will not be held liable for such decision, even though hindsight
indicates that the decision was not the wisest course. On the other hand, if the board has
acted solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in office, the use of
corporate funds for such purposes is improper. 39
In this context, judicial consideration of whether the directors acted "solely or
primarily" out of self-interest is directed toward the question of ultimate liability for
the alleged violation of the directors' fiduciary duty of loyalty and not toward the initial
30. Id. at 17, 187 A.2d at 407.
31. Id. at 17-18, 187 A.2d at 407.
32. Id. at 18, 187 A.2d at 407.
33. Id. at 18-19, 187 A.2d at 407.
34. Id. at 22, 187 A.2d at 409. The court found that this burden was not sustained by the defendant directors. Id.
35. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
36. Id. at 496-97, 199 A.2d at 549-50.
37. Id. at 507, 199 A.2d at 556.
38. Id. at 502, 199 A.2d at 553.
39. Id. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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allocation of the burden of proof. However, the court did not actually address the issue
of whether the directors had breached their duty of loyalty, which would have
abrogated the business judgment rule presumption. Rather, the court addressed the
allocation of the burden of proof between the challenging shareholders and the
defendant directors in light of the business judgment rule. The court specifically stated,
"Initially, the decision of the board of directors in authorizing a purchase was
presumed to be in good faith and could be overturned only by a conclusive showing
by plaintiffs of fraud or other misconduct.' '40 However, the court cited with approval
the language in Bennett that placed the initial burden of proof on the directors when
a threat to control was involved4' and automatically shifted the burden to the direc-
tors.
42
B. Burden on Plaintiff to Demonstrate that the Directors' Sole or Primary Motive
was to Retain Control
Unlike the Bennett and Cheff decisions, the courts in Johnson v. Trueblood43 and
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.44 placed a relatively high initial burden of proof on
challengers to a target corporation's defensive tactics. In Johnson v. Trueblood, the
plaintiffs owned forty-seven percent and the defendant directors owned fifty-three
percent of Penn Eastern, a real estate development company. 45 When the corporation
experienced financial difficulties, the defendants proposed to raise additional capital
by selling twenty-one new shares of stock to Arnold Trueblood, one of the majority
directors, at seven hundred fifty dollars per share. 46 The plaintiffs countered with an
offer to purchase twenty new shares at one thousand dollars per share, an offer that
would have shifted corporate control to the plaintiffs. 47 The defendant directors
subsequently rejected the plaintiffs' offer and approved the sale of stock to Arnold
Trueblood. 48 In a derivative suit challenging the directors' actions under Delaware law,
the plaintiffs contended that they only needed to prove that control was a motive for
the defendants' actions in order to rebut the business judgment rule presumptions, and
thereby shift the burden to the defendant directors. 49 In a two to one decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit found this standard to be insufficient, stating that while
control is arguably a motive in any action taken by a director, it is not, of itself, proof
of bad faith. 50 The court saw the business judgment rule as "postulating that if actions
are arguably taken for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed
40. Id.
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504-05, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
43. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
44. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
45. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 288 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
46. Id. at 289.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 292.
50. Id. at 292-93. See text accompanying note 22 for the Johnson court's rationale regarding a director's
self-interest in control.
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to have been exercising their sound business judgment rather than responding to any
personal motivations." 51 As Johnson illustrates, this formulation effectively precludes
a challenger's attack on the good faith of the target company's directors' defensive
tactics 52 by substituting an analysis of corporate benefits for any consideration of
directorial motives. Furthermore, the Johnson court held that to overcome the pre-
sumption of the business judgment rule and thereby shift this lesser burden to the
defendant directors, the plaintiff must "tender evidence from which a factfinder might
conclude that the defendant's sole or primary motive was to retain control.' '53
In his dissent, Judge Rosenn espoused the plaintiffs' position and contended that
the plaintiffs need only show that control was a motive in order to negate the
presumptions of the business judgment rule.54 Interpreting Bennett, he found that
when a transaction involving control of a corporation raises a conflict of interest on
the part of the board of directors, the burden of justification shifts to the defendant
directors. 55 Judge Rosenn correctly noted that the "sole or primary motive" language
in Cheff v. Mathes, relied upon by the majority in Johnson to establish a burden of
proof for the plaintiff, referred to establishing liability and not to the burden of proof
required to overcome the presumptions of the business judgment rule. 56 He advocated
shifting the burden of proof to the directors once a conflict of interest is established,
as was done in Cheff and Bennett.5 7
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. ,8 Marshall Field was faced with a hostile
takeover attempt by Carter Hawley Hale (CHH).59 In response, Marshall Field's
directors resolved to oppose CHH.6° Marshall Field implemented an expansion
program designed to raise an insurmountable antitrust barrier against CHH that
successfully deterred CHH from pursuing its bid.61 In a suit by shareholders of
Marshall Field against the company and its directors, the plaintiffs contended that the
directors resisted any takeover, regardless of possible benefits to the shareholders or
the corporation, because they sought to retain control of the company, thereby
breaching their fiduciary duty to the corporation. 62 In a two to one decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Delaware law, rejected the plaintiffs'
claim under a business judgment rule analysis. The court's evaluation of Marshall
Fields' policy toward proposed acquisitions rested on the presumption of good faith
afforded by the business judgment rule. 63 The court found that the plaintiffs
"presented no evidence of self-dealing, fraud, overreaching or other bad conduct
51. Id. at 292.
52. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 20, at 715-16.
53. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981) (emphasis added).
54. 629 F.2d 287, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting).
55. Id. at 300.
56. Id. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
57, Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 301 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
58, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
59, Id. at 279.
60, Id. at 280.
61, Id. at 280-81.
62. Id. at 293.
63. Id. at 296.
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sufficient to give rise to any reasonable inference that impermissible motives
predominated in the board's consideration of the approaches." 6 4 Furthermore, when
discussing the expansion program that fended off CHH, the court stated:
[E]ven if the desire to fend off CHH was among the motives of the board in entering the
transactions, because the plaintiffs have failed to establish that such a motive was the sole
or primary purpose, as has been required by Delaware law since the leading case of Cheff
v. Mathes, the mere allegation, or even some proof, that a given transaction was made on
"unfavorable" terms does not meet the fairly stringent burden the business judgment rule
imposes on plaintiffs. 65
The court's rationale mirrored that used by the Johnson court and imposed a
difficult burden for the plaintiffs to overcome.
In his dissent, Judge Cudahy argued that "the majority has adopted an approach
which would virtually immunize a target company's board of directors against
liability to shareholders. ' '66 He viewed issues dealing with the corporation-
shareholder relationship, such as corporate control, as those in which the courts may
actively promote equitable concerns. 67
C. Burden on Plaintiff to Demonstrate that a Motive of the Directors was to
Retain Control
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seems to have espoused an
intermediate burden for a challenger to a target corporation's defensive tactics.
Although the presumptions of the business judgment rule place the initial burden on
the plaintiff, the burden will shift to the directors if the plaintiff shows self-interest
or bad faith on the part of the directors. 68 However, this test is quite subjective-it
is unclear how much evidence must be produced to shift the burden. 69
In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,70 Care acquired almost one-third of
Treadway's outstanding common stock and indicated an interest in obtaining
control. 7 1 Treadway's directors then planned to merge with another corporation (Fair
Lanes). 72 The first step of the merger process was a sale to Fair Lanes, for cash, of
a large block of Treadway's treasury stock plus authorized but unissued stock. 73 This
64. Id.
65. Id. at 297 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
66. 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. Id. Judge Cudahy states that the majority fails to make the important distinction
between the activity of a corporation in managing a business enterprise and its function as a vehicle for
collecting and using capital and distributing profits and losses. The former involves corporate functioning in
competitive business affairs in which judicial interference may be undesirable. The latter involves only the
corporation-shareholder relationship, in which the courts may more justifiably intervene to insist on equitable
behavior.
Id. at 299-300 (quoting Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Companies, 58
COLuM. L. REv. 1030, 1066 (1958) (emphasis supplied by Judge Cudahy)).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 70-99.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 187-90.
70. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 364-65.
72. Id. at 365-66.
73. Id. at 366-68.
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transaction would dilute Care's holdings and thus prevent Care from blocking the
merger.74
At trial, Care contended that Treadway's directors caused the shares to be sold
to Fair Lanes for the sole or primary purpose of retaining control of the corporation.75
The court found that the sale of stock to Fair Lanes should be analyzed under the New
Jersey business judgment rule because the target company was a New Jersey corpora-
tion.76 Therefore, if Treadway's board of directors had determined that a Care
takeover would be detrimental to the corporation and its shareholders, they would be
justified in taking actions against it. 77 The business judgment rule's presumption of
good faith would protect their actions. 78
Although the court framed the business judgment rule based on the line of
Delaware cases represented by Bennett and Cheff, it declined to automatically shift
the initial burden to the directors, even though the issue of control was present.
The court stated that the initial burden of proving the director's interest or bad
faith always rests with the plaintiff.79 The plaintiff must demonstrate the directors'
self-interest in order to shift the burden to the directors. The court noted, "In nearly
all of the cases treating stock transactions intended to affect control, the directors who
approved the transaction have had a real and obvious interest in it: their interest in
retaining or strengthening their control of the corporation." 80
The court concluded that Care did not satisfy that burden. 81 Evidence was
presented that Fair Lanes had been interested in merging with Treadway for some
years, that the merger negotiations were not a sham, and that all but one of
Treadway's directors expected to lose their positions as Treadway directors after a
Fair Lane merger. 82 The court found that the Treadway directors were not acting to
maintain control over the corporation, but rather were endeavoring to consummate a
merger with Fair Lanes. 83 The court ultimately held that "Care has not demonstrated
an interest on the part of Treadway's directors . . . such as would shift onto the
directors the burden of proving fairness." '8 4
The burden on the plaintiff was clarified and probably eased in Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc.85 In Norlin, Piezo Electric Products purchased thirty-two percent
of Norlin's common stock. 86 In response, Norlin conveyed to a wholly-owned
subsidiary 800,000 shares of authorized but unissued preferred stock, which would
vote on a share-for-share basis with Norlin common stock, in exchange for a twenty
74. Id.
75. Id. at 380.
76. Id. at 381.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 382.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 383.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 259.
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million dollar interest-bearing note. 87 At the same time, Norlin established an
Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) by transferring 185,000 common shares to the
ESOP in exchange for a promissory note.88 Norlin was the beneficial owner of all the
transferred shares.8 9 Together with the shares already under their control and as a
result of these transactions, the Norlin directors controlled forty-nine percent of the
corporation's voting stock, which was sufficient to block a hostile takeover bid by
Piezo Electric Products. 90
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, construing the New York business
judgment rule, upheld a preliminary injunction enjoining the board of directors from
voting the contested shares. 91 The court stated that the business judgment rule
protects the directors' actions in resisting takeovers only when the directors are not
shown to have a self-interest in such actions. 92 The court inferred that the purpose of
the transactions was to perpetuate the directors' control of Norlin93 after considering
the evidence presented: that all of the stock transferred by Norlin was to be voted by
Norlin directors; that the ESOP was created at the same time that stock was issued to
it; and that the timing of such transactions corresponded to Piezo's interest in the
company. Such evidence "was more than adequate to constitute a prima facie
showing of self-interest on the board's part," thus shifting the burden of proof to the
directors. 94
It seems that Norlin required only that retention of control be merely a factor in
the contested transaction to shift the burden from the challenger to the defendant
directors. Although the court required a demonstration by the plaintiff of the
directors' self-interest in the transaction, 95 it did not require the plaintiff to show
retention of control to be a primary motivation of the directors. The court's analysis
held that "a prima facie showing of self-interest on the board's part" was sufficient
to shift the burden to the directors. 96 Furthermore, the court cited with approval the
dissenting opinions in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.97 and Johnson v. Trueblood,98
both of which expressly promulgated such a standard. 99
IV. THE BURDEN UPON THE DIRECTORS OF A TARGET COMPANY TO JUSTIFY THEIR
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
Assuming that a challenger to a target corporation's defensive tactics can
overcome or circumvent the presumptions of the business judgment rule, the burden
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 260, 269.
92. Id. at 265.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 646 F.2d 271, 299-312 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting).
98. 629 F.2d 287, 295-301 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57 for a discussion of Judge Rosenn's dissenting opinion in Johnson v.
Trueblood.
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of justification will then fall upon the directors of the target corporation. Under a
general business judgment rule analysis, a plaintiff's showing of self-dealing
sufficient to negate the presumption of good faith would place a heavy burden on the
defendant directors-the burden of showing that the transaction at issue was
intrinsically fair to the corporation and its shareholders. 100 However, in transactions
involving control, the courts have declined to impose such a stringent burden on the
directors.
A. Burden of Showing that the Transaction was Primarily in the Corporate
Interest
In Cheff v. Mathes,10' the court found that the conflict of interest inherent in a
transaction involving control shifted the burden to the directors to justify their action
as one primarily in the corporate interest. 02 The court distinguished the directors'
interest in corporate control from a personal and pecuniary interest in the transaction,
stating that while directors do bear the burden of proof in the former situation, they
"will not be held to the same standard of proof required of those directors"
implicated in the latter situation.' 03 The court in Cheff framed the issue to be whether
the directors showed "reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed by the presence of the Maremont stock ownership."' 0 4
Furthermore, the court found that directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation. 05 The court held that this burden was met, concluding:
[T]he board of directors, based upon direct investigation, receipt of professional advice, and
personal observations of the contradictory action of Maremont and his explanation of
corporate purpose, believed, with justification, that there was a reasonable threat to the
continued existence of Holland, or at least existence in its present form, by the plan of
Maremont to continue building up his stock holdings.106
In effect, the directors met the burden of the transaction being primarily in the
corporate interest "simply by showing that they planned to pursue a different strategy
than that proposed by the bidders, and by asserting a belief that their strategy was
better." 07 This analysis does not actually consider whether the transaction's business
purpose was primarily in the corporate interest. However, it does require sufficient
directorial justification of the corporate actions at issue to confirm the directors'
presumption of good faith.
100. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
101. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
102. Id. at 504-05, 199 A.2d at 554.
103. Id. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554-55. See supra notes 21 & 100 and accompanying text for the standard of proof
required for directors having a personal or pecuniary interest in the transaction.
104. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556.
107. Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HAxv. L.
Rrv. 1045, 1057 (1985).
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B. Burden of Showing that the Transaction had a Valid Corporate Business
Purpose
In Johnson v. Trueblood,t0 8 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
if the plaintiff rebutted the business judgment presumption of director good faith in
a control situation, the burden then would shift to the defendant directors to show that
the transaction could be attributed to a "valid corporate business purpose." 1 9 This
is an extremely lax standard. It does not address the concerns of fairness which exist
in a traditional business judgment analysis of a director's shifted burden. "10 Actually,
this standard avoids the question of good faith altogether, because directors who are
motivated by concerns of perpetuating their control need only demonstrate a rational
business purpose to justify their defensive strategies. This is inconsistent with the
business judgment rule, which is premised on the concept of directorial good faith." '
Allowing a director who acts in bad faith to justify his actions by rationalizing to
some other purpose should not obscure the violation of his fiduciary duty of loyalty
to the corporation and its shareholders. A proper business judgment rule analysis
must ensure that directors adhere to their fiduciary duties in actions taken against a
hostile takeover.
Similarly, in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,112 the court stated that once the
burden is shifted to the director, the director must prove that the transaction at issue
was "fair and reasonable" to the corporation.'l3 The court defined "fair" in this
context as "entered into for a proper corporate purpose, and not merely for the
directors' selfish purposes."" l4 The court's interpretation of the directors' burden
seems to correspond to the "valid corporate business purpose" standard adopted by
the Johnson decision. "15
C. Burden of Showing that the Transaction Was Fair and Reasonable to the
Corporation
In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc. ,116 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, citing Treadway, found that once the burden shifted to the directors, they
were required to prove that the transaction in question was fair and reasonable to the
corporation."17 However, unlike its holding in Treadway, the court did not modify
this language by allowing a showing of a valid corporate business purpose to satisfy
108. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
109. Id. at 293.
110. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
112. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 382. This is dictum, as the plaintiff could not make a showing sufficient to shift the burden to the
directors.
114. Id. "Courts have held that the directors can make a sufficient showing of fairness by demonstrating that the
transaction was entered into for a proper corporate purpose; they need not also prove that the actual terms of the transaction
were fair." Id. at 382 n.47 (citations omitted).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
116. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 265.
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the directors' burden. Is The court rejected the directors' contention that once a board
decides "that an actual or anticipated takeover attempt is not in the best interests of
the company, a board of directors may take any action necessary to forestall
acquisitive moves,""19 although such a test would seem to satisfy the Treadway
court's standard. Here, however, the court found that the ESOP was created solely as
a tool for management self-perpetuation, and thus, it was not fair and reasonable. 120
V. RECENT DECISIONS: UNOCAL CORP. V. MESA PETROLEUM CO. AND MORAN V.
HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL, INC.
A. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,121 Mesa, the owner of approximately
thirteen percent of Unocal's stock, commenced a two-tier "front-loaded" cash tender
offer for sixty-four million shares, or approximately thirty-seven percent of Unocal's
outstanding stock, at a price of fifty-four dollars per share. 122 The "back-end" was
designed to eliminate the remaining publicly-held shares by exchanging them for
securities purportedly worth fifty-four dollars per share.' 23 After considering the
offer, including presentations by expert financial advisors, Unocal's directors
concluded that Mesa's tender offer price was inadequate. 124 Furthermore, Unocal's
directors proposed to initiate a self-tender by Unocal for its own stock. If Mesa
acquired sixty-four million shares of Unocal stock through its own offer, the
self-tender provided that Unocal would buy the remaining forty-nine percent
outstanding shares for an exchange of debt securities having an aggregate par value
of seventy-two dollars per share. 125 Unocal sought either to defeat Mesa's inadequate
tender offer or, if the offer succeeded, to adequately compensate shareholders at the
"back-end" of Mesa's proposal, which the latter would finance with "junk
bonds." 126 Mesa was excluded from this proposal. 127
The Supreme Court of Delaware considered whether the Unocal board had both
the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat that it reasonably perceived to be
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 266-67.
121. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
122. Id. at 949. A two-tiered tender offer is "a partial tender offer . . .coupled with an announced plan to follow
up with a second-step merger at a lower price per share." Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire
Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. Lw. 485, 485 (1983). "Front-loaded" means that the first tier is a cash tender offer
while the second tier involves an exchange of securities or notes.
123. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985). However, Mesa's supplemental proxy
statement disclosed that these securities would be highly subordinated.
124. Id. at 950.
125. Id. at 950-51.
126. Id. at 956.
127. Id. at 951. The directors were advised by legal counsel that under Delaware law Mesa could only be excluded
for what the directors reasonably believed to be a valid corporate purpose. To include Mesa would defeat the objective
of adequately compensating shareholders at the second tier of Mesa's proposal because under the proration aspect of the
exchange offer (49%), every Mesa share accepted by Unocal would displace one held by another stockholder.
Furthermore, if Mesa were permitted to tender to Unocal, the latter would in effect be financing Mesa's own inadequate
proposal.
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harmful to the corporate enterprise and, if so, whether the directors' actions should
be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. 128 Mesa contended that the
business judgment rule should not protect Unocal because the exchange offer was not
fair to all shareholders (specifically Mesa); thus, Unocal violated the fiduciary duty
it owed to Mesa.' 29 In response, Unocal denied any duty of fairness owed to Mesa
because Unocal's board of directors concluded both that Mesa's tender offer was
coercive and inadequate, and that Mesa sought selective treatment for itself.130
Unocal claimed protection of the business judgment rule because the board's approval
of the exchange offer was made in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the
exercise of due care. 131
The court concluded that the board had the power to oppose Mesa's takeover
bid. 132 In evaluating whether the board was justified in exercising its power in this
situation, the court found that the business judgment rule is applicable in the context
of a takeover. 133
In determining the placement of the initial burden of proof, the court reasoned:
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine
whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that
respect a board's duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its
decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the
realm of business judgment. 34
However, the court cited with approval Bennett v. Propp,135 recognizing that in
a situation involving control a board might act primarily in its own interests. 136 The
court placed the initial burden on the directors, automatically shifting the burden to
them in a control situation.' 37
The court in Unocal placed a two-part burden on the directors. Under the first
prong, the "directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's
stock ownership." 138 This burden was satisfied by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation on the part of the directors, 139 the standard first established in Cheff v.
Mathes.140 Noting that the directors may not act solely or primarily out of a
desire to perpetuate themselves in office, the court found this standard "designed to
ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated
128. Id. at 953.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 953-54.
133. Id. at 954.
134. Id.
135. 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
136. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). See also supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
137. Id. at 955.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders, which
in all circumstances must be free of any fraud or other misconduct." '1 4'
The second prong of the directors' burden required the defensive measure at
issue to be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 142 This requirement "entails an
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the
corporate enterprise." 143 The court found that the directors were warranted in their
belief that the two-tier tender offer was inadequate, coercive, and linked to possible
greenmail. 44 Furthermore, Unocal's efforts to protect its shareholders reasonably
required Mesa's exclusion from the exchange offer. 145
B. Moran v. Household International, Inc.
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,146 a shareholder of Household
brought suit to invalidate a preferred stock rights dividend plan. 147 The plaintiff was
a director of Household, as well as chairman of Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corp.
(D-K-M), the largest single shareholder of Household. 48 Household's board of
directors enacted the rights plan as a preventive mechanism to preclude future
advances; the board perceived the company as a vulnerable takeover target.149 The
plaintiffs claimed that the rights plan gave Household's directors an effective right of
refusal to any takeover attempt, which entrenched the existing directors and
pre-empted the shareholders' right as owners of the corporate stock to participate in
a tender offer.' 50 According to the plaintiffs:
[T]he business judgment rule does not apply to actions designed to effect structural changes
in the relationship between stockholders and the Board, but if it does, the rule requires the
application of special scrutiny, with Household bearing the burden of proving that the Plan
is fair and reasonable to the shareholders.15'
141. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 956.
145. Id. at 956-57.
146. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
147. The rights plan worked as follows:
Basically, the Plan provides that Household common stockholders are entitled to the issuance of one Right per
common share under certain triggering conditions. There are two triggering events that can activate the Rights.
The first is the announcement of a tender offer for 30 percent of Household's shares ("30% trigger") and the
second is the acquisition of 20 percent of Household's shares by any single entity or group ("20% trigger").
If an announcement of a tender offer for 30 percent of Household's shares is made, the Rights are issued and
are immediately exercisable to purchase 1/100 share of new preferred stock for S100 and are redeemable by the
Board for S.50 per Right. If20 percent of Household's shares are acquired by anyone, the Rights are issued and
become non-redeemable and are exercisable to purchase 1/100 ofa share of preferred. Ifa Right is not exercised
for preferred, and thereafter, a merger or consolidation occurs, the Rights holder can exercise each Right to
purchase $200 of the common stock of the tender offeror for $100.
Id. at 1348-49.
148. Id. at 1349.
149. Id. At that time, Moran began discussions concerning a possible leveraged buy-out of Household by D-K-M.
This never progressed beyond the discussion stage. Id.
150. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
151. Id.
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The Court of Chancery of Delaware applied the business judgment rule as the
standard of review in this situation, stating "in the absence of fraud or bad faith,
directors will not be held liable for mistakes of judgment in actions arguably taken for
the benefit of the corporation." 152 The attendant presumption of good faith placed the
initial burden of proof on the challenging party to demonstrate bad faith. 153 Citing
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 15 4 Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 155 and
Johnson v. Trueblood,156 the court noted that "the shifting of the burden of proof in
control situations has been expressly rejected by majority decisions in three federal
circuits in cases applying Delaware law.' 1 57 Applying the standard of Johnson v.
Trueblood,158 the court stated that a showing of a motive to retain control was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith.' 59
The court, however, did shift the burden of proof to the defendant directors by
promulgating a theory of inquiry into the directors' actions other than an improper
motive inquiry:
Where, however, the takeover defensive device is itself calculated to alter the structure of
the corporation, apart from the question of motive, and results in a fundamental transfer of
a power from one constituency (shareholders) to another (the directors) the business
judgment rule will not foreclose inquiry into the directors' action.
Because the Rights Plan permits the Household Board to act as the prime negotiator of
partial tender offers through the power of redemption, the resulting allocation of authority
affects the structural relationship between the Board and the shareholders. It is this
fundamental result, rather than a mere conflict of interest, which requires the Board to
present evidence, the business judgment rule notwithstanding, that its approval of the Plan
was not motivated primarily by a desire to retain control but by a reasonable belief that the
Plan was necessary to protect the corporation from a perceived threat to corporate policy
and effectiveness. 160
The burden placed on the directors was identical to that used by the court in
Cheff v. Mathes :161 the directors must demonstrate that their actions were "reason-
able at the time." 162 The Moran court characterized this burden as "the burden of
going forward on a showing of reasonableness rather than a burden of persuasion,"1 6 3
because the presumption of good faith continues in effect until the plaintiffs can make
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
155. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
157. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
158. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (percuriam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
159. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). See supra
text accompanying notes 50-53 for a discussion of the Johnson standard for the plaintiffs' burden of proof.
160. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (emphasis
added).
161. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
162. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). See also
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964) (directors must show that their actions were
reasonable).
163. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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a showing of the directors' bad faith. 164 The Court of Chancery found in favor of the
defendants, concluding that the coercive nature of two-tier tender offers justified the
adoption of the rights plan to protect Household and its shareholders from such
offers. 165
In affirming the Court of Chancery's decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware
agreed that the business judgment rule was the proper standard of review for a target
company's defensive tactics. 166 The court found that this standard was appropriate
whether the directors' actions were directed toward a specific threat or, as in the
Moran case, the defensive mechanism was adopted to protect against prospective
takeover bids. ' 67
The supreme court, unlike the lower court, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the rights plan represented an unauthorized "fundamental transfer of power from the
stockholders to the directors." 168 The court found that if faced with a tender offer and
a request to redeem the rights, even if it were a hostile tender offer, the directors still
would "be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of directors would
be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism." ' 169 The board could reject a
bid only if their action was within the ambit of the business judgment rule. This
reasoning rendered moot the lower court's standard that shifted to the directors a
burden of reasonableness for their actions when their defensive tactics effected a
"fundamental transfer of power from the stockholders to the directors." 170 Instead,
the supreme court in Moran followed Unocal and reaffirmed the business judgment
rule as the applicable standard of judicial review for a target company's defensive
tactics. 171
Citing to Unocal, the Moran court placed the initial burden of proof on the
defendant directors because their adoption of a defensive mechanism implicated
concerns of corporate control. 172 Furthermore, the Moran court adopted the two-
prong standard promulgated by Unocal as the initial burden the directors were
required to meet in a control situation:173
The directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed.... [T]hey satisfy that burden by showing good
faith and reasonable investigation .... In addition, the directors must show that the
defensive mechanism was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 74
The court found that the directors adopted the rights plan "in the good faith
belief that it was necessary to protect Household from coercive acquisition tech-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1082-83.
166. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1354. Cf. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch. 1985) (lower court found the
plan fundamentally altered the corporate structure).
169. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
171. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985).
172. Id. at 1356.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
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niques" and after reasonable investigation of the mechanism of the rights plan.175 In
addition, the defendants demonstrated that the rights plan was reasonable in relation
to the threat posed. 176 The directors thereby satisfied their burden of proof and were
protected by the business judgment rule. 177 The burden then shifted back to the
plaintiffs who now had "the ultimate burden of persuasion to show a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties."' 78 The court upheld the adoption of the rights plan
because the plaintiffs could not make such a showing. 179
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF UNOCAL AND MORAN
The Unocal and Moran decisions are authoritative interpretations of the business
judgment rule's application in hostile takeover situations. The Supreme Court of
Delaware has sought to reconcile or override the deviations of the federal courts'
interpretations of the Delaware business judgment rule. In doing so, the court has
fashioned a workable business judgment rule analysis that balances concerns of
directorial fidelity against the need for directorial discretion in a hostile takeover
situation.
A. Burden of Going Forward Placed on Directors as a Matter of Law
The Supreme Court of Delaware properly placed the initial burden on the target
company's directors to justify defensive tactics under the business judgment rule. The
business judgment rule rests upon the validity of its inherent presumptions, including
the presumption of good faith. While it would be unfair to impugn the integrity of
corporate management by presuming that directors act in bad faith or self-interest in
a control situation, it would be unrealistic to assert that motives of control play no part
in their actions. There is sufficient doubt of directorial good faith raised by the nature
of a takeover situation' 80 to require some form of judicial scrutiny of the target
directors' duty of loyalty before granting the directors the protection of the business
judgment rule. In an abstract sense, the factors that justify a presumption of utmost
loyalty for business decisions do not counterbalance the obvious direct threat to
corporate management in a hostile takeover situation.
From a mechanical perspective, placement of the initial burden on the target
company's directors is the best way to ensure adequate judicial scrutiny of the target
company's defensive tactics and the directors' adherence to their fiduciary duty. In
Johnson v. Trueblood 8' and Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,182 the courts required
the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the directors' sole or primary motive was to retain
175. Id. at 1357.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1356.
179. Id. at 1357.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
181. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), vacatedon other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (percuriam), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 999 (1981).
182. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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control. 83 By making the plaintiffs' burden so stringent, the courts strengthened the
business judgment rule presumption beyond the degree warranted by a control
situation. In most cases, the difficulty of shifting the burden to the directors would
preclude any substantive consideration of the merits of the directors' actions. In
Panter, despite various actions on the part of the directors that could have supported
an allegation of self-serving management entrenchment, 18 4 the court declined to
examine the directors' actions because the plaintiffs could not meet their burden of
demonstrating that the directors' primary purpose for their actions was retention of
corporate control. ' 85 Judge Cudahy's dissenting opinion in Panter aptly categorized
the standard imposed on the plaintiff by the majority as "an approach which would
virtually immunize a target company's board of directors against liability to
shareholders .. . ."186 Both the directors' presumed interest in a hostile takeover
situation and the shareholders' interest in their investment mandate that the directors
justify their actions. The "sole or primary motive" standard does not meet this need.
Furthermore, because courts must resolve legal issues involving directors'
motives based on a set of facts largely within the control of the directors, it would be
extremely difficult for a plaintiff to meet a stringent test involving motives. Again,
the directors would rarely have to answer for their actions. A stringent initial burden
on plaintiffs that could rarely be met may tempt directors to employ improperly
motivated defensive tactics in light of judicial indifference.
In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp. ' 87 and Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,188
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit imposed a lesser burden on the plaintiff:
a showing that retention of control be merely a factor in the directors' actions. 89 This
standard presents a difficulty in that "a prima facie showing of self-interest on the
board's part, ' 190 sufficient to shift the burden to the directors, is too subjective.
Because motivation of control generally must be inferred from the directors' actions,
a court would have great discretion in determining whether control was a motivating
factor. This discretion should not shield directors from having to justify their conduct
regarding a hostile takeover, just as the business judgment rule itself should not shield
directors without reaffirmation of directorial loyalty.
By placing the initial burden on the directors as a matter of law in an action
involving a target company's defensive tactics, the Supreme Court of Delaware in
Unocal and Moran has reaffirmed the allocation of the initial burden set forth in
Bennett v. Propp'9' and Cheff v. Mathes.192 This was necessary to ensure adequate
183. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53 (discussing the Johnson decision) and 64-65 (discussing the Panter
decision).
184. See supra text accompanying note 61.
185. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
186. Id. at 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting).
187. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
188. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
189. Seesupra text accompanying notes 79-84 (discussing the Treadway decision) and 92-99 (discussing theNorlin
decision).
190. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).
191. 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
192. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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judicial scrutiny of a target company's defensive tactics. Such scrutiny could be
negated, however, by the federal courts' placement of the initial burden on the
challengers to a target company's defensive tactics, thereby placing an excessively
stringent burden on the plaintiffs or giving the court too much discretion to avoid a
review on the merits of the defensive maneuvers. The Supreme Court of Delaware's
decisions should guide the federal courts in future business judgment rule analyses,
for they unequivocally shift the initial burden to the target company's directors to
justify their defensive tactics against a hostile takeover.
B. The Burden Upon the Directors of a Target Company: An Intermediate
Standard
The burden placed on the directors must be sufficient to validate both the courts'
presumption of directorial good faith and its subsequent reliance upon the business
judgment rule in actions involving corporate control. However, the burden placed on
the directors must not be so stringent as to negate the directorial discretion that is
integral and necessary to the effective operation of the business judgment rule in the
hectic pace of a hostile takeover, lest the courts abandon the business judgment rule
altogether. The standard promulgated by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Unocal
and Moran seems to properly strike such a balance.
The courts in Johnson v. Trueblood 193 and Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp. 194
imposed a limited burden on the directors to justify their defensive tactics: the
directors need only show that the transaction could be attributed to a "valid corporate
business purpose." 195 This standard is inadequate to meet the concerns of the
business judgment rule. The directors should have the initial burden to justify their
defensive tactics to ensure against an unquestioned presumption of good faith in an
action directly involving managerial control. A standard requiring only that the
directors show a valid corporate business purpose for their actions does not answer
such concerns. It is the motives of the directors that are at issue, not their actions.
Once their motives are found to be valid, the directors' actions are protected by the
business judgment rule.
In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 196 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit required the directors to prove that their actions were fair and reasonable to
the corporation.197 Although this standard could be interpreted as meeting the
concerns of the business judgment rule regarding directorial loyalty, it is too vague
for proper judicial application. A court could interpret this language to allow the
directors to justify their actions by meeting a lesser standard. This occurred in
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., when the court equated "fair and reasonable" to the
corporation as "entered into for a proper corporate purpose."1 98 Furthermore, the
193. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
194. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
196. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
198. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 48:273
DIRECTOR LOYALTY AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS
Norlin analysis demonstrates that a judicial determination of whether the directors'
actions were fair and reasonable is a very subjective factual interpretation. A proper
standard should provide more structural guidelines, both for the directors who must
meet the standard in their conduct, and for the courts that must interpret the standard.
At the opposite extreme, a court could require the directors to demonstrate the
intrinsic fairness of their defensive tactics. In a traditional business judgment rule
analysis, this is the burden imposed upon a fiduciary who is shown to have acted in
self-interest or bad faith; 99 it is a negation of the business judgment rule. However,
it should not be applied as the initial burden on directors to justify their actions in a
control situation because the business judgment rule should still be in effect. It is
unnecessary to automatically negate the presumption of directorial good faith in a
hostile takeover situation; it merely should be confirmed. A stringent requirement on
the directors to prove the intrinsic fairness of their actions would be an excessive
burden. This burden cannot be justified in a hostile takeover situation absent proof of
actual wrongdoing on the part of the directors. This standard, if applied in each
instance, would severely curtail the directors' discretion to act in a hostile tender offer
situation-discretion which is necessary for the directors to effectively participate in
the takeover process, and to uphold their fiduciary obligations to act in the best
interests of the company and its shareholders.
The standard espoused by the Supreme Court of Delaware in the Unocal and
Moran decisions strikes the proper balance between judicial scrutiny and directorial
discretion in a suit involving a target company's defensive tactics. The first prong of
that standard, requiring the directors to demonstrate good faith and reasonable
investigation,2°° does not eliminate the possibility of improper motives for the
directors' use of defensive tactics, nor does it ensure that those tactics are
"intrinsically fair." However, it does enable the court to review the directors'
conduct in light of their fiduciary obligations by requiring the directors to demonstrate
the factors that they considered in their decision and the conclusions to which they
purportedly came. The second prong of the test, requiring the directors to show that
their actions were reasonable in relation to the threat posed, 20' is an additional check
on the directors' actions. Realistically, judicial review of corporate action can only
require an informed decision based on rational premises, which is the outcome of the
Supreme Court of Delaware's standard. This standard gives the court enough
discretion to find against the directors if their actions are based on arbitrary decisions
or contrived motivations. If the directors meet this initial scrutiny, the burden shifts
back to the challengers to demonstrate that the directors acted in bad faith. 202
199. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41 (discussing the Unocal decision) and 173-75 (discussing the Moran
decision).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45 (discussing the Unocal decision) and 174 & 176 (discussing the
Moran decision).
202. See supra text accompanying note 178.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Note has focused on the role of the business judgment rule in judicial
evaluations of target company defensive tactics. A court's analysis must balance the
need for adequate scrutiny of fiduciary loyalty against the necessity of directorial
discretion. Various courts and commentators have promulgated views which tend to
be either too lenient toward judicial review, thereby rubber-stamping the directors'
actions irrespective of their motives, or too stringent, limiting the directors' ability to
wage a legitimate defense against a hostile takeover. This Note concludes that the
Supreme Court of Delaware has established an intermediate standard that satisfies
these two concerns and suffices to confirm the validity of the directors' good faith in
their defensive actions under the business judgment rule presumptions.
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